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In the last few years, the assessment of non-horizontal mergers in the European Union (“EU”)
has evolved considerably. There is now a consistent body of jurisprudence and administrative
decisions on the assessment of vertical and conglomerate concentrations. The goal pursued is
consumer welfare; the potential benefits of non-horizontal mergers are recognized and sound eco-
nomic thinking is relied upon in identifying those instances where such mergers could lead to
anti-competitive effects. Several developments have significantly contributed to this evolution.
Two judgments of the European Courts have necessarily to be mentioned first: in 2004 the Euro-
pean Court of Justice (“ECJ”) established general principles on the assessment of non-horizontal
mergers in the Commission v. Tetra Laval BV (“Tetra/Sidel”) judgment, which were completed
and made operational by the Court of First Instance (“CFI”) one year later in its judgment in Gen-
eral Electric Co. v. Commission (“GE/Honeywell”). Second, an amended Merger Regulation
entered into force in May 2004. This introduction of a new test, which no longer requires proof
that a merger will lead to dominance before allowing intervention to prevent consumer harm, is
particularly relevant for non-horizontal mergers. Third, the European Commission (“the Com-
mission”), in November 2007, adopted guidelines on the assessment on non-horizontal mergers
which, within the legal framework set up by the Courts, attempt to develop an economically sound
approach for the analysis of vertical and conglomerate concentrations. Finally, during this period,
the Commission has dealt with several vertical and conglomerate mergers in its enforcement de-
cisions, which have allowed it to already apply and refine its policy in a number of individual
situations. This Article describes in detail and comments on all of these developments, both from





In the last few years, the assessment of non-horizontal merg-
ers in the European Union ("EU") has evolved considerably.
There is now a consistent body of jurisprudence and administra-
tive decisions on the assessment of vertical and conglomerate
concentrations. The goal pursued is consumer welfare; the po-
tential benefits of non-horizontal mergers are recognized and
sound economic thinking is relied upon in identifying those in-
stances where such mergers could lead to anti-competitive ef-
fects.
Several developments have significantly contributed to this
evolution. Two judgments of the European Courts have necessa-
rily to be mentioned first: in 2004 the European Court of Justice
("ECJ") established general principles on the assessment of non-
horizontal mergers in the Commission v. Tetra Laval BV (" Tetra/
Sider) judgment,1 which were completed and made operational
by the Court of First Instance ("CFI") one year later in its judg-
ment in General Electric Co. v. Commission ("GE/Honeywell") .2 Sec-
ond, an amended Merger Regulation 3 entered into force in May
2004. This introduction of a new test, which no longer requires
proof that a merger will lead to dominance before allowing in-
tervention to prevent consumer harm, is particularly relevant for
non-horizontal. mergers. Third, the European Commission
("the Commission"), in November 2007, adopted guidelines on
the assessment on non-horizontal mergers which, within the le-
gal framework set up by the Courts, attempt to develop an eco-
nomically sound approach for the analysis of vertical and con-
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1. Commission v. Tetra Laval BV, Case C-12/03 P, [2005] E.C.R. 1-987.
2. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Commission, Case T-210/01, [2005] E.C.R 11-5575.




glomerate concentrations.4 Finally, during this period, the Com-
mission has dealt with several vertical and conglomerate mergers
in its enforcement decisions, which have allowed it to already
apply and refine its policy in a number of individual situations.
This Article describes in detail and comments on all of these
developments, both from a legal and from a policy perspective.
I. THE TETRA/SIDEL AND GE/HONEYWELL
JURISPRUDENCE ON NON-HORIZONTAL MERGERS
In the seventeen years of application of the Merger Regula-
tion, the ECJ and the CFI have ruled on the interpretation of
many of its provisions. However, while they had dealt already
with a number of Commission decisions, including an analysis of
non-horizontal effects,5 the European Courts did not need to de-
velop jurisprudence on the substantive assessment of such cases
until quite recently. The appeals against the Commission's pro-
hibition decisions of the Tetra/Sidel and GE/Honeywell transac-
tions provided the first opportunity to develop a consistent body
of principles in this area of merger law. The main elements of
this jurisprudence are presented below.
A. The Interpretation of the Merger Test and the Standard of Proof
for Non-Horizontal Mergers
At the time of the adoption of the Tetra/Sidel and GE /Hon-
eywell decisions, Article 2 of the Merger Regulation provided that
the European Commission had to appraise mergers with a view
to establishing whether or not they would "create or strengthen
a dominant position as a result of which competition would be
significantly impeded in the EU market or a substantial part of
it."6 One of the key issues dealt with by the Tetra/Sidel appeal
was the definition of the standard of proof that this test imposed
4. See Commission Notice, Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal merg-
ers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertak-
ings (Nov. 28, 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/
legislation/nonhorizontalguidelines.pdf [hereinafter Guidelines].
5. See, e.g., MCI, Inc. v. Commission, Case T-310/00, [2004] E.C.R. 11-3253;
BaByliss SA v. Commission, Case T-114/02, [2003] E.C.R. 11-1279; Royal Philips Elec.
NV v. Commission, Case T-119/02, [2003] E.C.R. 11-1433; Endemol Entm't Holding BV
v. Commission, Case T-221/95, [1999] E.C.R. 11-1299.
6. Council Regulation No. 4064/89, art. 2, O.J. L 257/90, at 13 (1990) (originally
published in O.J. L 395 (1989)) (on the control of concentrations between undertak-
ings).
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on the Commission, in particular in the context of the assess-
ment of a conglomerate merger.7
The Commission argued that Article 2 of the Merger Regu-
lation requires a "balance of probabilities" assessment of all pro-
posed mergers, irrespective of the type of merger being as-
sessed.' The Commission, indeed, considered that Article 2 of
the Merger Regulation created a symmetrical obligation on the
Commission to authorize a concentration if it is not likely to cre-
ate or strengthen a dominant position and to prohibit it if it is
likely to create or strengthen it.9 This reflected, in the Commis-
sion's view, an underlying choice by the Community legislator,
clearly apparent in the terms and structure of the Regulation,
equally to protect, on the one hand, the private interests of the
merging parties and, on the other hand, the public interest in
maintaining effective competition and the interests of consum-
ers.
The CFI, in itsjudgment' ° annulling the Commission's deci-
sion,1 made it clear that the Merger Regulation applies equally
to all types of mergers:
The Regulation, particularly in Article 2(2) and (3), does not
draw any distinction between, on the one hand, merger trans-
actions having horizontal and vertical effects and, on the
other hand, those having a conglomerate effect. It follows
that, without distinction between those types of transactions,
a merger can be prohibited only if the two conditions laid
down in Article 2(3) are met.' 2
However, the CFI also stated that "[s]ince the effects of a con-
glomerate-type merger are generally considered to be neutral, or
even beneficial, for competition on the markets concerned...
the proof of anti-competitive conglomerate effects of such a
merger calls for a precise examination, supported by convincing
evidence, of the circumstances which allegedly produce those ef-
fects." 3 This sentence, while not explicitly imposing a different
7. Tetra Laval, [2005] E.C.R. 1-987.
8. Id. 3.
9. Id. 29.
10. Tetra Laval BV v. Commission, Case T-5/02, [2002] E.C.R. 11-4381.
11. See Commission Decision No. COMP/M.2416, O.J. L 43/13 (2004) (Tetra La-
val/Sidel).
12. Tetra Laval, [2002] E.C.R. 11-4381, 146.
13. Id. 55.
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assessment standard for conglomerate mergers, opened a discus-
sion as to whether the CFI was actually establishing a distinction
as to the burden of proof applying to them.
The ECJ, in ruling on the assessment standard, does not
make any distinction on the applicability of the Regulation to
different types of mergers. It also seems to confirm the symmet-
rical character of the test by indicating that, in conducting a pro-
spective merger analysis, the Regulation requires an examina-
tion of "various chains of cause and effect with a view to ascer-
taining which of them are the most likely." 4 This symmetrical
character of the merger test appears to have been later con-
firmed by the CFI in the GE/Honeywell judgment, which indi-
cated that the Merger Regulation does not establish any pre-
sumption as to the compatibility or incompatibility of mergers
and that: "[i] t is not the case that the Commission must find in
favour of a concentration falling within its jurisdiction in a case
in which it might entertain doubts but rather that it must always
make an actual decision one way or another. ""
As to the burden of proof applying to conglomerate merg-
ers, the ECJ notes that the CFI's reference to convincing evi-
dence "by no means added a condition relating to the ... stan-
dard of proof but merely drew attention to the essential function
of evidence, which is to establish convincingly the merits of an
argument or ... of a decision."16 However, the ECJ added that:
The analysis of a "conglomerate-type" concentration is a pro-
spective analysis in which, first, the consideration of a lengthy
period of time in the future and, secondly, the leveraging
14. Tetra Laval, [2005] E.C.R. 1-987, 43. The European Court of Justice ("ECJ")
appears not to have followed the Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano that had sug-
gested an asymmetric test, requiring the Commission to be persuaded that the opera-
tion would "very probably" create or strengthen a dominant position. In particular,
according to Advocate General Tizzano, a concentration should be authorized in cases
"where it is especially difficult to foresee the effects of the notified transaction and
where it is therefore impossible to arrive at a clear distinct conviction that the likeli-
hood that a dominant position will be created or strengthened is significantly greater or
less than the likelihood that such a position will not be created or strengthened." Opin-
ion of Advocate General Tizzano, Commission v. Tetra Laval BV, Case 12/03 P, [2004]
E.C.R. 1-987, 74, 76.
15. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Commission, Case T-210/01, [2005] E.C.R. 11-5575, 61.
The same symmetric interpretation of a substantive appraisal standard was applied af-
terwards by the CFI to Article 81. See GlaxoSmithKline Servs. Unlimited v. Commission,
Case T-168/01, [2006] E.C.R. 11-2969, 1 249.'
16. Tetra Laval, [2005] E.C.R. 1-987, 1 41.
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necessary to give rise to a significant impediment to effective
competition mean that the chains of cause and effect are
dimly discernible, uncertain and difficult to establish. 17
That being so, the quality of the evidence produced by the Com-
mission in order to establish that it is necessary to adopt a deci-
sion declaring the concentration incompatible with the common
market is particularly important, since that evidence must sup-
port the Commission's conclusion that, "if such a decision were
not adopted, the economic development envisaged by it would
be plausible." 8 The ECJ, therefore, seems to draw a distinction
between different types of mergers in terms of the level of evi-
dence necessary to prove their anticompetitive effects. In those
cases where the anticompetitive effects of the merger are not im-
mediate, but rather depend on the effects that the conduct of
the merged entity will have in the market in the future, for in-
stance through the foreclosure of competitors (or "leveraging"
as the ECJ says), such evidence should be "particularly impor-
tant."
While maintaining the same assessment standard for all
types of mergers, it seems reasonable to distinguish the level and
quality of evidence necessary to prove different theories of harm,
as the ECJ does. It would generally be easier to demonstrate the
likely anticompetitive effects linked to a horizontal merger re-
moving a direct competitive constraint, for instance, than those
linked to theories that require several more steps of reasoning
and that would lead to anticompetitive effects-not immedi-
ately-but at a certain point in the future. This raises the ques-
tion, however, of whether all non-horizontal mergers would only
impede effective competition in an indirect way, therefore re-
quiring such "particularly important" evidence to be put for-
ward. Indeed, competition concerns raised in non-horizontal
mergers often result from the risk of foreclosure of actual com-
petition. In such cases the theory of harm relies on the fact that
the merged entity is likely to have the ability and incentives to
engage in certain conduct in the future (e.g. refusal to deal, ty-
ing) that would raise the cost of rivals, ultimately leading to anti-
competitive effects. However, there are also non-horizontal




merger and the detrimental effect on competition. For instance,
a vertical merger may have direct anti-competitive effects by al-
lowing a firm to gain access to commercially sensitive informa-
tion concerning its rivals. Or the merger itself, with no specific
action of the merged entity required, may already change the
incentives of potential entrants into a certain market (for in-
stance requiring a two-level entry post-merger) and lead to im-
mediate anti-competitive effects.1" In view of this, it seems diffi-
cult to conclude that the Tetra/Sideljudgment has established a
higher burden of proof for all non-horizontal mergers per se. It
is rather more plausible to conclude that the level and quality of
evidence will depend very much on the nature of the theory of
harm advanced by the Commission, and in particular the period
of time which the theory anticipates will elapse before the anti-
competitive effects are likely to materialize.
Looking ahead, the operational conclusion from the above
would seem to be that, in order to apply the test in Article 2 of
the Merger Regulation, the Commission must apply a "balance
of probabilities" standard and, therefore, in order to prohibit a
merger or request remedial action, it should demonstrate that a
significant impediment of effective competition is more likely
than not.20 This assessment standard applies equally to both
horizontal and non-horizontal mergers.
With regard to the burden of proof, the Commission must
in all cases provide convincing evidence to sustain the conclu-
sion that the test is, or is not, met. The level and quality of the
evidence necessary to meet such a burden will largely depend on
the theory of harm that the Commission is advancing. A distinc-
tion can, in that regard, be made between those concentrations
that would immediately have an anticompetitive effect, such as a
horizontal merger, or a non-horizontal merger with an immedi-
ate effect, and those operations having a less immediate impact
on competition, such as vertical or conglomerate mergers that
would lead to foreclosure of actual rivals. Such a distinction,
however, is more a distinction of degree than an absolute one.
The more speculative the theory of harm advanced, or the
19. See Claes Bengtsson et al., The Substantive Assessment of Mergers, in EU COMPETI-
TION LAw: VOL. II: MERGERS & AcQuISMIONs 312-13 (Gotz Drauz & Christopher Jones
eds., 2006).
20. See Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Bertelsmann AG, Sony Corporation
of America v. Commission, Case C-413/06 (ECJ Dec. 13, 2007) (not yet reported).
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longer the time-frame for competitive effects which the theory
forecasts, the more difficult it will be for the Commission to
meet the test of Article 2.
B. The Assessment of Foreclosure Theories
In the GE/Honeywell judgement, the Court of First Instance
develops the general principles established by the European
Court of Justice and sets out, in a more detailed manner, the
different steps in the assessment that the Commission should
carry out, and examines how the Commission went about this
assessment in the particular case. The CFI's focus is on the fore-
closure theories which, in the form of alleged likelihood of fu-
ture refusal to deal or bundling by the merged entity, were at the
core of the Commission's case.21
The CFI starts by acknowledging that the anti-competitive
effects alleged by the Commission "would have only followed
from the merger in so far as the merged entity had adopted cer-
tain behaviour after the merger .... In those circumstances, the
Commission had the onus to provide convincing evidence to
support its conclusion that the merged entity would probably be-
have in the way foreseen. 22 This would require, first, that the
Commission prove the capacity or ability to engage in such prac-
tices and second, that it would prove that it was likely that the
merged entity would engage in such conduct. Once ability and
likelihood have been established, the Commission is required to
establish that those practices would have created or strength-
ened, in the relatively near future, a dominant position on some
of the markets concerned s.2  As we will see, this three-step analy-
sis (ability, likelihood/incentives, effects) will become the or-
ganizing principle for the Commission assessment of non-hori-
zontal mergers and hence forms the basis for the analytical
framework set out in its non-horizontal guidelines.
21. The Commission decision, however, was upheld by the Court of First Instance
("CFI") relying on purely horizontal theories of harm. Indeed, the CFI concluded that
the conclusion that the operation would have strengthened GE's dominant position in
the market for jet engines for large regional aircraft and would have created a domi-
nant position in the markets for engines for corporate jet aircraft and small marine gas
turbines were sufficient, in the absence of adequate remedies, to justify a finding of
incompatibility. See Gen. Elec., [2005] E.C.R. 11-5575, 732-34.
22. Id. 1 68-69 (referring to conglomerate effects); see id. 295 (referring to
vertical effects).
23. See id. 327, 405 (referring specifically to conglomerate practices).
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1. Ability
Certain conditions have to be satisfied for a merged entity
to be able to engage successfully in foreclosure practices. In the
GE/Honeywell judgment, the CFI particularly examines some of
these conditions in the section dealing with the ability of the
merged entity to engage in so-called "pure" and "technical" bun-
dling practices, with regard to the sale of aircraft engines, avion-
ics and non-avionics products.
First of all, the CFI analyzes whether the market characteris-
tics and the behavior of customers would allow the merged en-
tity to engage in those practices. In the examination of pure
bundling, for instance, the CFI notes that only in some situations
is the customer for engines, avionics and non-avionics products
the same. Indeed, there are situations where the engine and/or
some avionics are already chosen by the air-framer and the air-
line buying the aircraft has only a limited choice between addi-
tional avionics products. In these situations, the ability to en-
gage in bundling practices is limited or even non-existent. The
CFI also notes that, in many instances, the selection of engines
and avionics takes place at different points in time. While this
circumstance may not prevent bundling, it would certainly make
it much more difficult for it to succeed. 4
Second, the CFI examines whether the Commission had es-
tablished that the merged entity would have sufficient market
power in one of the bundled product markets in order to be
able to impose the bundle successfully on its customers. This
analysis would require an examination of whether the customers
of the bundling product would have alternatives, and in particu-
lar whether substitute products would be available in the market.
Even in situations where the bundle would include GE engines,
and despite the fact that the CFI was satisfied that GE held a
dominant position in this market, the CFI requires the Commis-
sion to establish that customers would have lost all residual
power to refuse the imposition of the bundling practices. 25
2. The Likelihood of Foreclosure Practices
Once the ability of the merged entity to engage in certain
24. Id. 1 407-16.
25. Id. 422-23.
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practices is established, there are several means, according to the
CFI, to prove the likelihood of such practices actually taking
place. First of all, documents attesting to the settled intention of
the board of directors of one of the merging parties to engage in
certain practices post-merger could be considered convincing ev-
idence.2 6
But most often, the likelihood of certain anti-competitive
practices occurring will depend on the economic incentives that
the merged entity will have to engage in them. Such incentives
can be gauged by comparing the likely costs to the merged entity
of such practices with the benefits that they would be likely to
produce. In view of this, economic studies assessing such trade-
offs are often considered by the CFI as a necessary means to con-
vincingly demonstrate likelihood. The CFI, for instance, states:
"[i] n some cases, such evidence may consist of economic studies
establishing the likely development of the market situation and
demonstrating that there is an incentive for the merged entity to
behave in a particular way." 27
It adds, however, that:
[T]he absence of evidence of that type is not in itself decisive.
In particular, in a situation in which it is obvious that the
commercial interests of an undertaking militate predomi-
nantly in favour of a given course of conduct, such as making
use of an opportunity to disrupt a competitor's business, the
Commission does not commit a manifest error of assessment
in holding that it is likely that the merged entity will actually
engage in the conduct foreseen. In such a case, the simple
economic and commercial realities of the particular case may
constitute the convincing evidence required by the case-law. 28
On the basis of these considerations, the CFI considered
that the Commission's analysis of the incentives of the merged
entity to engage in input foreclosure in the engines starter mar-
ket was "persuasive." Indeed, the fact that the merger would
lead to the vertical integration of Honeywell-which was de
facto the only supplier of engine starters, a relative low-cost but
crucial component of aircraft engines-and GE-which already
held a dominant position in the market for the manufacture of
26. Id. 1 332-33; see also id. 11 439-43.
27. Id. 296.
28. Id. 1 297.
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such engines for large commercial aircraft-was sufficient to
conclude that it would be in the commercial interests of the
merged entity to use its power as the unavoidable supplier of
these products as a means of disrupting its competitors' engine
production. In particular, the CFI noted that the profits that the
merged entity could make by selling engine starters to GE's com-
petitors would be minimal compared to the profits it could ob-
tain by increasing its share of the market of engines for large
commercial aircraft at the expense of these competitors. 29
In the absence of any of the types of evidence mentioned in
the previous paragraphs, the CFI is unlikely to find that the
Commission has proved to a sufficient degree the likelihood of
particular conduct taking place in the market post-merger. In
fact, the CFI considered that the Commission had not provided
such evidence in this particular case and had not, therefore, suf-
ficiently established the likelihood that the merged entity would
engage in the bundling of jet engines with avionics and non-
avionics products, or in other practices aimed at exploiting the
commercial interests of the GE group in order to promote sales
of Honeywell's products." In particular, the CFI noted in sev-
eral paragraphs of the judgment that such practices would have
probably involved certain costs for the merged entity and "would
have been rational commercial behaviour following the merger
only in so far as the revenues which the merged entity was likely
to derive from those practices would have offset that potential
cost."1 1 As the Commission had not provided economic studies
comparing, at least on the basis of reasonable estimates, any
such costs with any such revenues, it could not infer that the
practices in question were likely.
3. The Specific Issue of Legal Disincentives
In assessing the likelihood that the merged entity would en-
gage in certain practices, a particularly controversial question is
how the Commission should take into account the possible ille-
gality of such practices. Foreclosure practices could, indeed, in
some instances be contrary to national and/or EU law and, in
particular if the merged entity holds a dominant position, they
29. See id. 299.
30. Id. 99 470-73.
31. Id. 99 338-39; see also id. 1 444-62.
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could constitute an abuse under Article 82 of the EU Treaty.1
2
Does this mean that the Commission should exclude the possi-
bility that the merged entity might engage in such behavior or,
taking the contrary view, should such considerations play any
role in an assessment under the Merger Regulation? The EC
and the CFI, in Tetra/Sidell and GE/Honeywell, have provided
slightly different replies to this question.
In the Tetra/Sidel judgment, the CFI, when assessing the
likelihood that Tetra would engage in leveraging, stated the fol-
lowing:
When the Commission, in assessing the effects of such a
merger, relies on foreseeable conduct which in itself is likely
to constitute abuse of an existing dominant position, it is re-
quired to assess whether, despite the prohibition of such con-
duct, it is none the less likely that the entity resulting from
the merger will act in such a manner or whether, on the con-
trary, the illegal nature of the conduct and/or the risk of de-
tection will make such strategy unlikely. While it is appropri-
ate to take account ... of incentives to engage in anti-compet-
itive practices . . . the Commission must also consider the
extent to which those incentives would be reduced, or even
eliminated, owing to the illegality of the conduct in question,
the likelihood of its detection, action taken by the competent
authorities, both at Community and national level, and the
financial penalties which could ensue.33
As the Commission had not carried out such an assessment in
the contested decision, the CFI considered that its findings
based on anti-competitive leveraging practices could not be up-
held.
In its appeal of the CFI judgment, the Commission argued
that the requirement to conduct such an assessment was con-
trary to the purpose of the Merger Regulation. Indeed, if Article
82 were sufficient to prevent abuses, it would not have been nec-
essary to make provision for ex ante control of concentrations.
It also argued that a requirement to carry out such an assessment
presented the Commission with virtually insuperable legal and
practical obstacles. It required the Commission to examine the
propensity of firms to comply with the law, thereby inevitably de-
priving such firms of the benefit of the presumption of inno-
32. Id. 86.
33. Tetra Laval BV v. Commission, Case T-5/02, [2002] E.C.R. 11-4381, 159.
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cence. Moreover, the risk of detection would depend on the
strictness of competition policy and enforcement in each Mem-
ber State and would, therefore, be very difficult to assess in ac-
cordance with the standard of proof required by the CFI.
The ECJ ruled in favor of the Commission on this issue. It
clearly stated that:
The Court of First Instance erred in law in rejecting the Com-
mission's conclusions ... on the sole ground that the Com-
mission had, when assessing the likelihood that such conduct
might be adopted, failed to take account of the unlawfulness
of that conduct and, consequently, of the likelihood of its de-
tection, of action by the competent authorities, both at Com-
munity and national level, and of the financial penalties
which might ensue.3 4
The ECJ accepted that the Commission should assess both the
incentives of the merged entity to adopt certain conduct and the
factors liable to reduce, or even eliminate those incentives, in-
cluding the possibility that the conduct would be unlawful.
However, to perform such an analysis in the manner prescribed
by the CFI "would run counter to the Regulation's purpose of
prevention." 5 Moreover, such an analysis, by being too specula-
tive, would prevent the Commission from basing its assessment
on a purely factual and economic basis.36
Surprisingly, and despite this conclusion, the CFI again re-
quired the Commission in the GE/Honeywell judgment to con-
duct an analysis of the possible illegality of the conduct in which
the merged entity could engage. In so doing, the CFI inter-
preted that the ECJ's judgment in Tetra/Sidel had not excluded
the need to perform such an analysis. In the CFI' view, the ECJ's
judgment did not "require to establish that the conduct foreseen
in the future will actually constitute an infringement of Article
82 or that, if that were to be the case, that infringement would
be detected and punished." It simply required the Commission
to conduct a "summary analysis based on the evidence available
to it."" As such an analysis had not been performed in the case
at hand, the CFI considered that the Commission had not estab-
34. Commission v. Tetra Laval BV, Case C-12/03 P, [2005] E.C.R. 1-987, 78.
35. Id. 75.
36. See id. 77.
37. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Commission, Case T-210/01, [2005] E.C.R. 11-5575, 304.
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lished the likelihood that the merged entity would engage in cer-
tain practices, such as vertical foreclosure in the engine starters
market or some types of bundling. As we have seen, in the ab-
sence of the legal disincentive, the CFI had considered the analy-
sis of the Commission on the likelihood of such practices to be
"persuasive."
To conclude on this point, in GE/Honeywell the CFI seems to
have followed a middle road between the two possible extreme
solutions to this difficult issue: either requiring the Commission
to conduct a full analysis into the possible disincentive that the
illegality could represent, as the CFI had previously ruled in
Tetra/Sidel, with all the difficulties that such analysis might entail;
or excluding completely this type of analysis on the basis that the
Merger Regulation is a preventive instrument, adopted precisely
to avoid illegal conduct. There is at least clarity-and some mer-
its-in both these solutions. It is, however, less easy to say with
certainty what are the obligations that the CFI's intermediate
line now imposes on the Commission. And it is certainly not
easy to reconcile the line most recently adopted by the CFI with
the ECJ's reasoning in Tetra/Sidell and, in particular, to under-
stand how a summary analysis would not run counter to the Reg-
ulation's underlying purpose of prevention, or indeed why it
would be less speculative than an analysis based on full evidence.
For the time being, however, this is the most recent jurispru-
dence on this issue and, as such, it will have to be taken into
account by the Commission in the assessment of most non-hori-
zontal mergers (see below, in the description of the guidelines,
how the Commission plans to apply this jurisprudence in prac-
tice).
4. Effects
The Commission should not confine itself to establishing
the ability and likelihood of foreclosure theories, but should also
demonstrate that such foreclosure would produce anticompeti-
tive effects. Indeed, the Merger Regulation is based on a con-
sumer welfare standard and, therefore, the exclusion or
marginalization of competitors in a certain market is not of itself
sufficient to establish a finding of incompatibility. Rather, it
should be proved that, by raising the costs of one or more com-
petitors, or excluding them from the market, the merger would
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ultimately have an anticompetitive effect and harm consumer
welfare.
The GE/Honeywelljudgment restates the need to prove anti-
competitive effects but, as it had already rejected the Commis-
sion's findings due to the lack of evidence on the ability or likeli-
hood of the merged entity to engage in foreclosing conduct, it
did not need to examine the Commission's assessment of the
effects. The judgment contains only one relevant consideration
to this regard, which requires the Commission to assess the ef-
fects on each relevant market separately."8
II. THE ASSESSMENT OF EFFECTS UNDER
THE NEW MERGER REGULATION
It should be examined whether the new test of the Merger
Regulation, which establishes in Article 2 that the Commission
has to assess whether a concentration "would significantly im-
pede effective competition, in the common market or in a sub-
stantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or
strengthening of a dominant position, '39 could have any impact
on the jurisprudence; both cases presented above were based on
the previous wording of that article.
The change in the test was generally explained as an at-
tempt, first, to shift from a more structural paradigm, where the
notion of dominance was central to the analysis, to a more ef-
fects-based approach, where the impact of the concentration in
market outcomes (price, output, innovation, etc.) would be at
the center of the Commission's analysis. Second, the new test
was also intended to eliminate any possible enforcement "gap"
by covering those mergers that, while not creating or strengthen-
ing a dominant position, would nevertheless cause consumer
harm.
This change is particularly relevant to the assessment of
non-horizontal mergers. In effect, the new test no longer re-
quires demonstrating that the effects of the concentration would
be the creation or strengthening of a dominant position but
rather that it would significantly impede effective competition.
And indeed, in a number of instances, the integration between a
company with market power in one market with another com-
38. See id. 362.
39. Council Regulation No. 139/2004, art. 2, OJ. L 24/1, at 7 (2004).
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pany operating in a vertically related or neighboring market
could lead to consumer harm in the latter one, without the
merged entity acquiring a dominant position in this latter mar-
ket.
This is particularly the case for "raising rivals' costs" theories
of harm.40 Indeed, the concern with regards to raising rivals'
costs, be it in the more direct form of input foreclosure or in the
more indirect one of customer foreclosure, is not that a domi-
nant position will be created as a result of vertical integration,
but rather that such structural change will negatively affect mar-
ket outcomes, for instance leading to higher prices. These theo-
ries of harm, as will be explained below, are central to the Com-
mission's guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal merg-
ers.
It is curious to see, in retrospect, that the debate about
whether to modify the test of the Merger Regulation did not fo-
cus more on these possible "gaps" in the previous test. Rather,
that debate was centered on the perceived gap with regard to
non-coordinated effects arising from horizontal mergers in
oligopolistic markets. 41 Recital 25 of the Merger Regulation,
which refers to the amendment of the test, does not exclude that
the new test would also be applicable to non-horizontal set-
tings.42 Indeed, by indicating that the new test would cover "the
anti-competitive effects of a concentration resulting from the
non-coordinated behaviour of undertakings which would not
have a dominant position on the market concerned," it seems
clearly to include non-coordinated foreclosure practices result-
ing from a non-horizontal merger, even when the entity would
not have a dominant position on the market concerned.43
III. THE NON-HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
In November 2007 the Commission adopted guidelines on
the assessment of non-horizontal mergers,44 setting out the ana-
lytical approach it takes in assessing the likely competitive impact
40. See DAMIEN NEVEN, CURRENT COMPETITION LAW, VOL. V, at 394-98 (Philip Mars-
den et al. eds., 2007).
41. See, e.g., Claus-Dieter Ehlermann et al., Unilateral Effects: The Enforcement Gap
Under the Old EC Merger Regulation, 28 WoRLt COMPETITION L. & ECON. REv. 193 (2005).
42. See Commission Regulation No. 139/2004, pmbl. 25, O.J. L 24/1, at 4 (2004).
43. See id.
44. See generally Guidelines, supra note 4.
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of vertical and conglomerate mergers within the legal framework
established by the Courts. The main goal of these guidelines is
to provide guidance to companies contemplating this type of
merger, but at the same time, as with any other interpretative
Notice, they also contribute to increasing the coherence of the
Commission's enforcement practice and to providing enhanced
legal predictability. They complement the existing guidelines on
the assessment of horizontal mergers, which deal with mergers
between companies who are actual or potential competitors in
the same relevant market(s).4
A. The Adoption Process of the Non-Horizontal Guidelines
The Commission, as it did before adopting the horizontal
guidelines, prepared the adoption of the non-horizontal ones by
extensively reviewing the relevant economic theory and litera-
ture.46 It also sought advice from its own Economic Advisors
Group on Competition Policy ("EAGCP"), which proposed 10
principles on which the non-horizontal guidelines should be
based.47 The drafting of the guidelines resulted from a joint ef-
fort within the Directorate General for Competition ("DG Com-
petition") involving the Merger Network, the Chief Economist
Team and the Competition Policy Directorate, and benefited
from comments of other services in the Commission as well as
from national competition authorities.
As it usually does before adopting any major interpretative
Notice, the Commission published draft guidelines in February
2007.48 The publication by the Commission of guidelines in a
draft form is intended to give to interested parties the opportu-
nity to express their views and make comments. In view of the
45. Commission Communication, OJ. C 31/03 (2004) (on the assessment of hori-
zontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between
undertakings).
46. See generally JEFFREY CHURCH & UNIV. OF CALGARY DEP'T OF ECON., THE IMPACT
OF VERTICAL AND CONGLOMERATE MERGERS ON COMPETITION (2004); RBB ECONOMICS,
THE EFFICIENCY-ENHANCING EFFECTS OF NON-HORIZONTAL MERGERS (2005).
47. ECON. ADV. GROUP FOR COMPETITION POL'Y ("EAGCP"), NON-HoRIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES: TEN PRINCIPLES (2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/
competition/mergers/legislation/non-horizontal-guidelines.pdf.
48. See Draft Commission Notice, Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal
mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between un-
dertakings, (Feb. 13, 2007) [hereinafter Draft Guidelines], available at http://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/legislation/non-horizontalconsultation.html.
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relevance of this document for merger control policy, a three-
month long consultation period was opened after publication,
lasting until May 12, 2007.4 ' Thirty-two comments were received
in response to the public consultation, 5° mostly from the busi-
ness and legal community. Many of these comments broadly
praised the Commission's draft, but also raised concerns with re-
gard to several areas or messages in the guidelines. Many also
provided useful drafting suggestions. The general concerns
raised by the draft guidelines are briefly summarized below.
As to the need for guidance, most respondents broadly wel-
comed the publication of guidelines. Only one respondent pro-
posed not to issue guidelines because it considered that the ex-
isting case law under the revised Merger Regulation was too lim-
ited. Some other comments suggested that guidance be limited
to vertical issues, and should not deal with possible conglomer-
ate concerns.
As to the general principles, the suggestion of many com-
ments was to emphasize further the potential efficiencies gener-
ated by non-horizontal mergers. In this regard, several respon-
dents objected to the fact that the sections outlining potential
scenarios of harm occupy substantially more space than the enu-
meration of potential pro-competitive effects of non-horizontal
mergers. Others, while accepting that the focus of the guide-
lines should be on those cases that warrant an investigation
rather than on those that do not raise problems, would neverthe-
less welcome that the efficiency enhancing aspects of non-hori-
zontal mergers are emphasized further.
Some commentators also pointed out that economic theo-
ries that identify harm from non-horizontal mergers are less ro-
bust than equivalent theories for horizontal operations and,
therefore, can be less reliable in defining policy. The fact that
consumer harm does not result directly from the concentration
but only from certain behavior from the merging firm, and
therefore, the possibility to tackle such behavior through ex-post
analysis, and in particular, by Article 82 TEU, is also, according
49. See Commission Launches Public Consultation on Draft Non-Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines, COMPETITION PoI'Y NEWSLETTER, Spring 2007, at 16, available at http://ec.europa.
eu/comm/competition/publications/cpn/cpn2007-l.pdf.
50. Comments received in response to a public consultation are available on the
European Commission's Competition website, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competi-
tion/mergers/legislation/non horizontalconsultation.html.
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to some commentators, a distinct feature of non-horizontal
mergers.
In view of all the above, several papers advocated a degree
of regulatory restraint in examining non-horizontal mergers (a
"light-touch regulatory approach" as one contribution refers to
it).5" Others conclude that a stricter standard of proof, or even a
presumption of legality, should apply.52
More specific comments and the reaction of the Commis-
sion to them will be presented in the sections of this Article
describing the different parts of the guidelines.
B. General Overview of the Commission's Analysis
of Non-Horizontal Mergers
The guidelines are structured in four main parts: (i) a gen-
eral overview, (ii) the definition of "safe harbours" in terms of
market shares and concentration levels, (iii) the assessment of
vertical mergers, and (iv) the assessment of conglomerate merg-
ers.
53
The guidelines start by acknowledging, as one of the main
messages in the introductory section, that there are differences
between non-horizontal and horizontal mergers with regards to
their impact on competition and that the former are generally
less likely to give rise to competition concerns than the latter.54
They also explain at length the reasons behind this difference.
First, unlike horizontal mergers, vertical or conglomerate
mergers do not entail the loss of direct competition between the
merging firms in the same relevant market. As a result, the main
source of anti-competitive effects in horizontal mergers is absent
from vertical and conglomerate mergers.55
Second, vertical and conglomerate mergers typically pro-
51. See INT'L BAR ASS'N ANTITRUST COMM., IBA WORKING GROUP ON THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION's DRAFT GUIDELINES ON THE ASSESSMENT OF NON-HoRIZONTAL MERGERS
9-12, available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/legislation/files-
nonhorizontal-consultation/iba.pdf.
52. See LINKLATERS/CRA INT'L, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S DRAFT GUIDELINES ON
THE ASSESSMENT OF NoN-HoRIzONTAL MERGERS 4 (2007), available at http://ec.europa.
eu/comm/competition/mergers/legislation/files-non horizontal_consultation/link
laters.pdf.
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vide substantial scope for efficiencies.56 A characteristic of verti-
cal mergers and certain conglomerate mergers is that the activi-
ties and/or the products of the companies involved are comple-
mentary to each other." The integration of complementary
activities or products within a single firm may produce signifi-
cant efficiencies and be pro-competitive. 8 For instance, in verti-
cal mergers, efforts to increase sales at one level (e.g. by lowering
price, or by stepping up innovation) will benefit sales at the
other level. 9 Depending on the market conditions, integration
may increase the incentive to carry out such efforts.6" The inter-
nalization of double mark-ups after the vertical integration, (i.e.
lowering the mark-up upstream may lead to increased sales not
only upstream but also downstream and vice versa) is particularly
taken into account in this context.6 1
The guidelines also acknowledge that vertical and conglom-
erate mergers may reduce transaction costs and allow for better
coordination in terms of product design, the organization of the
production process, investments in production factors along the
value chain and the way in which the products are sold.6 2 Simi-
larly, mergers which involve products belonging to a range of
products that are generally sold to the same set of customers (be
they complementary products or not) may give rise to customer
benefits such as facilitating one-stop-shopping.63
The main task of the guidelines, however, is to provide gui-
dance in identifying those circumstances in which non-horizon-
tal mergers may significantly impede effective competition or, in
other words, change the ability and incentive to compete on the
part of the merging companies and their competitors in ways
that are likely to cause harm to consumers. The guidelines dis-
tinguish between two main ways in which non-horizontal merg-
56. See id. 13.
57. See id. Products or services are called "complementary" (or "economic comple-
ments") when they are worth more to a customer when used or consumed together
than when used or consumed separately. A merger between upstream and downstream
activities can be seen as a combination of complements which go into the final product;
for instance, both production and distribution fulfill an indispensable role in getting a





62. See id. 14.
63. See id.
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ers may significantly impede effective competition: non-coordi-
nated effects and coordinated effects. 64
Non-coordinated effects will principally arise when non-hor-
izontal mergers give rise to foreclosure.65 In the guidelines, the
term "foreclosure" is used to describe any instance where actual
or potential rivals' access to supplies or markets is hampered or
eliminated as a result of the merger, thereby reducing these
companies' ability and/or incentive to compete.66 As a result of
such foreclosure, the merging companies-and, possibly, some
of its competitors as well-may be able to profitably increase the
price charged to consumers or cause harm to consumers in
other ways. These instances are referred to as "anticompetitive
foreclosure."
In assessing the likelihood of an anticompetitive foreclosure
scenario, in line with what the jurisprudence has required (see
above), the Commission will examine: first, whether the merged
entity would have, post-merger, the ability to substantially fore-
close a market; second, whether it would have the incentive to
do so, and; third, whether a foreclosure strategy would have a
significant detrimental effect on competition, thus causing harm
to consumers.
In practice, these three factors are often examined together
since they are closely intertwined. Nonetheless, the Commission
finds it useful to make clear that, even though the merged entity
may have the ability to foreclose, it may not have the incentive to
do so. Moreover, even where the merged entity may have the
ability and incentive to foreclose, this may not have a significant
detrimental effect on consumers.
Coordinated effects arise where the merger changes the na-
ture of competition in such a way that firms that previously were
not coordinating their behavior, are now significantly more
likely to coordinate and raise prices or otherwise harm effective
competition.67 A merger may also make coordination easier,
more stable or more effective for firms, which were coordinating
prior to the merger.68
64. See generally id.
65. See id. 18.
66. See id.
67. See id. 19.
68. See id.
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The guidelines also make it clear that in all cases, in assess-
ing the effects of a merger, the Commission will consider both
the possible anti-competitive effects arising from the merger and
the pro-competitive effects stemming from efficiencies identified
and substantiated by the parties.
Finally, there is another clarification in the introductory
part that it is worth mentioning. The guidelines indicate that
when intermediate customers are actual or potential competitors
of the parties to the merger, the Commission will focus on the
effects of the merger on the customers to which the merged en-
tity and those competitors are selling. Consequently, the fact
that a merger affects competitors is not in and of itself viewed as
a problem. It is the impact on effective competition on which
the Commission will focus, not the mere impact on competitors
at some level of the supply chain.
1. Definition of "Safe Harbours"
One important objective of the guidelines is to enable firms
to identify easily those mergers that are unlikely to be chal-
lenged on competition grounds. To this purpose, the guidelines
include a number of thresholds ("safe harbours"), expressed
both in qualitative and quantitative terms, and indicate that it is
unlikely that the Commission would identify competition con-
cerns with regard to mergers falling below such thresholds.
First of all, the draft guidelines stated that non-horizontal
mergers pose no threat to effective competition unless the
merged entity has market power in at least one of the markets
concerned.69 Many respondents to the public consultation ar-
gued, however, that the notion of "market power" was too wide
and not clearly defined by case law. Some would prefer to qual-
ify it (and refer to "substantial" or "significant" market powers)
and some argued that dominance, rather than market power
should be the benchmark. In the final text of the guidelines the
Commission took these comments into account; they now state
that "non-horizontal mergers pose no threat to effective compe-
tition unless the merged entity has a significant degree of market
power (which does not necessarily amount to dominance) in at
least one of the markets concerned. ' 70
69. See Draft Guidelines, supra note 48, 23.
70. See Guidelines, supra note 4, 23.
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The guidelines also include numerical "safe harbours" as a
screen to identify cases that are unlikely to raise competition is-
sues. The guidelines provide that the Commission is unlikely to
find concerns in relation to non-horizontal mergers where the
market share post-merger of the new entity in each of the mar-
kets concerned is below thirty percent" and where the post-
merger Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index ("HHI") is below 2000.72
In practice, it will not extensively investigate such mergers, ex-
cept where some special circumstances are present, which
render market shares less useful as a proxy for the competitive
conditions in the market.
It must be noted that a number of respondents to the public
consultation on the draft guidelines criticized these safe
harbours as overly cautious. In particular, it was mentioned that
thirty percent represents only five percent more than the thresh-
old used in the Form CO to identify vertically affected markets.
It was also indicated that the threshold to be used for merger
assessment should be higher than the one applying to vertical
agreements, in particular in view of the efficiencies that normally
derive from the former. A threshold of forty percent appeared
to be the preference of several commentators. A few also sug-
gested that an additional safe harbour could be introduced re-
ferring to the presence of the merged entity, not only in the
foreclosing market, as it is the case now, but also in the fore-
closed one. The Commission, however, did not take these com-
ments on board and maintained the same quantitative thresh-
olds in the final guidelines as in the published draft.
2. Assessment of Vertical Mergers
a. Non-Coordinated Effects: Foreclosure
With regard to vertical mergers, the guidelines identify two
principal foreclosure scenarios: input foreclosure and customer
foreclosure.73 The first takes place when the merger is likely to
raise the costs of downstream rivals by restricting their access to
an important input. 4 The second takes place when the merger
71. See id. 25; see also Commission Regulation No. 2790/1999, O.J. L 336/21
(1999).
72. See Guidelines, supra note 4, 25.
73. See id. 30.
74. See id.
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is likely to foreclose upstream rivals by restricting their access to
a sufficient customer base.75
b. Input Foreclosure
A merger may significantly impede effective competition
through input foreclosure where, post-merger, the new entity
would be likely to restrict access to the products or services that
it would have otherwise supplied absent the merger, thereby rais-
ing its downstream rivals' costs by making it harder for them to
obtain supplies of the input at similar prices and under similar
conditions as they could have absent the merger. This may give
the merged entity the ability and the incentive profitably to in-
crease the price charged to consumers. Any efficiencies result-
ing from the merger, however, may lead the merged entity to
reduce price, so that the overall likely impact on consumers may
be neutral or positive. The figure below gives a graphical pres-










A Overall effect on consumers?
The guidelines outline a variety of factors that may in prac-
tice affect a merged firm's ability and incentive to foreclose, and




sure strategy can be effective only if the merged firm has a signif-
icant degree of market power in the input market"7 and the in-
put represents a significant cost factor or an otherwise critical
component for rival firms.7" Incentives to foreclose are affected,
among other factors, by the trade-off the merged firm has to
make between the profit lost in the upstream market due to a
reduction of input sales to (actual or potential) rivals and the
profit gain from expanding sales downstream or, as the case may
be, being able to raise price in that market.79
In relation to legal disincentives, the guidelines start by
quoting the jurisprudence of the Court, and by stating that when
the adoption of a specific course of conduct by the merged en-
tity is an essential step in foreclosure, the Commission will ex-
amine both the incentives to adopt such conduct and the factors
liable to reduce, or even eliminate, those incentives, including
the possibility that the conduct would be unlawful. It is also indi-
cated that this appraisal, however, does not require an exhaus-
tive and detailed examination of the rules of the various legal
orders which might be applicable and of the enforcement policy
practiced within them. But the guidelines try at the same time to
provide some guidance as to which factors will be taken into ac-
count by the Commission in proceeding with such an analysis.
They indicate that such factors will be, in particular: (i) the like-
lihood that this conduct would be clearly, or highly probably,
unlawful under Community law, (ii) the likelihood that this ille-
gal conduct could be detected, and (iii) the penalties which
could be imposed."
Further, the guidelines deal with the effects of the merger
on effective competition. To this regard, it is normally required
that the foreclosed firms play a sufficiently important role in the
competitive process on the downstream market.8 " However, in
certain circumstances, effective competition may also be signifi-
cantly impeded by raising barriers to entry to potential competi-
tors. 2
The guidelines also make it clear that the effect of the
77. See id. 35.
78. See id. 1 34.
79. See id. 1 40.
80. See id. 46.
81. See id. 48.
82. See id. 49.
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merger on competition needs to be assessed in light of any effi-
ciencies identified and substantiated by the merging parties. For
the Commission to take account of efficiency claims in its assess-
ment of the merger, the efficiencies have to benefit consumers,
be merger-specific and be verifiable.83
The section on efficiencies attracted substantial interest in
the public consultation. A number of replies criticized the fact
that the draft guidelines applied the same burden of proof for
efficiencies as the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. It was argued
that efficiencies are an inherent part of non-horizontal mergers
and that the burden of proof should therefore be lower. A num-
ber of respondents would also like more detailed guidance on
how the Commission will balance anti-competitive effects and ef-
ficiencies in these cases. Some also requested further clarifica-
tion that the Commission will not apply an "efficiency offence"
doctrine. The Commission reacted to these comments by clarify-
ing some aspects of the section on efficiencies and provided an
explicit response to the "efficiency offence" claim, by clearly in-
dicating in the final guidelines that "the fact that rivals may be
harmed because a merger creates efficiencies cannot in itself
give rise to competition concerns."4
c. Customer Foreclosure
Customer foreclosure may occur when a supplier integrates
with an important customer in the downstream market. Because
of this downstream presence, the merged entity may foreclose
access to a sufficient customer base to its actual or potential ri-
vals in the upstream market (the input market) and thereby re-
duce their ability or incentive to compete. In turn, this may raise
downstream rivals' costs by making it harder for them to obtain
supplies of the input at similar prices and under similar condi-
tions as they would absent the merger. This may allow the
merged entity profitably to set higher prices in the downstream
market. Again, any efficiencies resulting from the merger may
lead the merged eptity to reduce price, so that there is no overall
negative impact on consumers. Like for input foreclosure, the
Commission's assessment will include an analysis of the merged
83. See id. 52-57. On this point, the guidelines refer to the paragraphs on the
assessment of efficiencies included in the horizontal guidelines.
84. Id. 16.
NON-HORIZONTAL MERGERS
firm's ability and incentive to engage in a foreclosure strategy, as
well as an evaluation of the potential size of the detrimental im-
pact on consumers. A graphical representation of this mecha-
nism is provided in the figure below:85
Upstream Rivals
entity upstream 1. Customer
foreclosure?
(Efficiencies?) -





A Overall effect on consumers?
d. Coordinated Effects
The guidelines provide an overview of factors that typically
enhance firms' ability to effectively co-ordinate their competitive
behavior. The section is based on the requirements set out by
the CFI in the Airtours PLC v. Commission judgment.86 Three
conditions are, thus, necessary for coordination to be sustaina-
ble. First, the coordinating firms must be able to monitor to a
sufficient degree whether the terms of coordination are being
adhered to. Second, discipline requires that there is some form
of credible deterrent mechanism that can be activated if devia-
tion is detected. Third, the reactions of outsiders, such as cur-
rent and future competitors not participating in the coordina-
tion, as well as customers, should not be able to jeopardize the
results expected from the coordination.
3. Assessment of Conglomerate Mergers
The final sections of the guidelines are dedicated to con-
85. See id. 58.
86. Airtours PLC v. Commission, Case T-342/99, [2002] E.C.R. 11-2585.
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glomerate mergers.8 7 These are mergers between firms that are
in a relationship which is neither purely horizontal (as competi-
tors in the same relevant market) nor vertical (as supplier and
customer). In practice, the focus is on mergers between compa-
nies that are active in closely related markets (e.g. mergers in-
volving suppliers of complementary products or of products
which belong to a range of products that is generally purchased
by the same set of customers for the same end use).
While the guidelines acknowledge that conglomerate merg-
ers will, in most circumstances, not lead to any competition
problems, they try to identify those specific cases where there
may be harm to competition. The section on conglomerate
mergers follows essentially the same structure as the guidance on
vertical mergers.8" The draft distinguishes between non-coordi-
nated effects (foreclosure) and coordinated effects as principal
theories of harm. 9 Foreclosure through tying and bundling are
the principal potential theories of harm discussed in the section.
The guidelines downplay the so-called "portfolio effects" theo-
ries in the absence of tying or bundling, and do not make any
reference to possible theories based on the financial strength of
one or more of the merging parties.90
The guidelines outline the factors that may give a merged
firm the ability and the incentive to foreclose (conceptually, the
analysis is similar to the one proposed for consumer foreclosure
theories) and presents the parameters affecting the likely overall
impact of a conglomerate merger on prices and consumer
choice. The guidelines also discuss potential sources of effi-
ciency gains in this context, including pricing efficiencies
("Cournot effect")."
IV. THE COMMISSION'S RECENT ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE
In recent years the Commission has assessed an important
number of mergers involving non-horizontal aspects. While
most of these operations did not raise competition concerns,
there were a few of them that required a closer investigation, or
87. See Guidelines, supra note 4, 91.
88. See id. 28.
89. See id. 91-118.
90. See id. 104.
91. See id. It 115-18.
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even remedial action, to eliminate possible non-horizontal con-
cerns.
Since the entry into force of the new Merger Regulation (on
May 1, 2004) until the publication of the draft guidelines, there
had been twelve cases where the Commission identified con-
cerns after a second phase investigation. Out of these twelve
cases, seven (fifty-eight percent) were based on purely horizontal
grounds, four (thirty-three percent) included both horizontal
and non-horizontal elements, and in one case (nine percent)
the problem identified was of a purely vertical nature.92 As is
evident from these statistics, non-horizontal mergers have repre-
sented a more limited source of concern, relative to horizontal
ones, particularly in recent years, but certainly not an inconse-
quential one.
A. Recent Vertical Mergers Analyzed by the Commission
Three relatively recent vertical merger cases analyzed by DG
Competition are presented in this section. They have been se-
lected because they shed light on how the Commission's ap-
proach to vertical mergers, set out in the draft guidelines, works
in practice, and in particular on its assessment of whether there
is a risk of input or customer foreclosure post-merger.
These cases include Philips/Intermagnetics,95  which was
cleared in first phase, Thales/Finmeccanica/Alcatel Alenia Space and
Telespazio (Thales),94 which was cleared only after a second phase
investigation and ENI/EDP/GDP,95 which was prohibited. There
are also a number of recent cases, not covered in this Article,
where the Commission requested remedial action on the basis of
vertical concerns. 96
92. If one would have examined, instead, the twenty prohibition decisions the
Commission has adopted in merger cases since 1990, the following picture would
emerge: twelve decisions (sixty percent) were based on purely horizontal grounds, six
(thirty percent) were solely based on non-horizontal concerns and two (ten percent)
included both horizontal and non-horizontal issues.
93. See, e.g., Pierre Lahbabi & Sophie Moonen, A Closer Look at Vertical Mergers,
COMPETITION POL'Y NEWSLETTER, Summer 2007, at 11, 11-17, available at http://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/comm/competition/publications/cpn/cpn2007-2.pdf.
94. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.4300, slip op. (Nov. 7, 2006), cited in OJ.
C 123/10 (2006) (Philips/Intermagnetics).
95. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.4403, slip op. (Apr. 4, 2007), cited in OJ.
C 248/23 (2006) (Thales/Finmeccanica/Alcatel Alenia Space & Telespazio).
96. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.3440, slip op. (Dec. 9, 2004), cited in OJ.
C 185/03 (2004) (ENI/EDP/GDP).
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1. Philips/Intermagnetics
This case concerned the acquisition by Philips of In-
termagnetics, its main supplier of magnets and radio frequency
("RF") coils. These are two key inputs for the magnetic
resonance imaging ("MRI") systems developed and produced by
Philips' healthcare systems division. The Commission examined
whether Intermagnetics, once integrated in the Philips group,
would have the ability and incentive to foreclose Philips' compet-
itors on the downstream market for MRI systems, such as Gen-
eral Electric and Siemens.
With regard to magnets, the Commission did not identify
concerns. Pre-merger, Intermagnetics had already been supply-
ing ninety-ninety percent of its production of magnets to Philips
for several years and major competitors were already vertically
integrated. Vertical integration in this area would rather facili-
tate cooperation in product development and provide Philips
with the security of sourcing of its own magnets in the future.
With regard to RF coils, however, the situation was different.
Intermagnetics held high market shares on the open market,
and pre-merger it supplied this key input to several third party
MRI manufacturers. In view of this, the Commission analyzed in
detail the ability and incentives of the merged entity to engage
in input foreclosure.
The ability of the new entity to foreclose RF coils customers
proved to be limited for several reasons. In the short term, the
merged entity would be bound by existing RF coil supply con-
tracts linking Intermagnetics to its customers. These were long-
term contracts with severe penalty clauses for any disruption of
supply, and a close analysis of these contracts showed that they
would have made a scenario of voluntary disruption post-merger
counter-productive.
In the longer term, any attempt by the merged entity to dis-
rupt supply to existing customers by Intermagnetics could be
faced by counter-strategies by these customers. The market in-
vestigation showed that customers could turn to at least one
other RF coil manufacturer that was deemed able to step up its
production of RF coils. Furthermore, the customers in question
had the strong research capabilities and the expertise necessary
to develop and manufacture RF coils and would be able to pro-
duce a new model of RF coils within two years. As a matter of
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fact, there had been several instances in the past of such custom-
ers switching from RF coil supply by Intermagnetics to internal
production in less than two years. Alternatively, Intermagnet-
ics's customers would be able to sponsor entry upstream, in par-
ticular by RF coil suppliers that could turn to the supply of RF
coils for MRI systems relatively quickly.
It is worth noting that, in assessing counter-strategies, the
Commission took a pro-active view, taking into account possible
alternatives for Philips's rivals, such as developing their internal
capabilities or sponsoring entry by a new supplier, that would
only have medium term effects.
The Commission also concluded that the incentives for the
new entity to engage in any form of input foreclosure after the
expiration of the supply contracts were minimal. It appeared
that the new entity could not expect to make profits by refusing
to supply RF coils.97 Philips made low gross and incremental
margins on the market for MRI systems. However, relative to
Philips' MRI activity, the RF coil activity of Intermagnetics was
very profitable. Thus, refusing to supply RF coils would require
substantial expected extra sales of MRI systems to offset the loss
of RF coil sales. Neither did input foreclosure by means of price
increases seem to be a profitable avenue for the merged entity.98
RF coils account for a relatively limited percentage of the MRI
costs. The Commission assessed what impact a substantial in-
crease in the price of coils might have on GE's and Siemens's
cost structure and concluded that they would not be likely to
force them to increase their selling prices of MRI on a sustaina-
ble basis, in particular in view of their ability to switch or develop
alternatives in the medium term.
Analysis of incentives of the kind carried out in this case was
rarely found in the Commission's decisions before the Tetra/Sidel
judgment. However, it has now become commonplace in any
assessment of possible anti-competitive effects resulting from
97. See, e.g., Commission Decision No. COMP/M.4494, slip op. (Feb. 20, 2007),
cited in OJ. C 5/4 (2007) (Evraz/Highveld); Commission Decision No. COMP/M.4314,
slip op. (Dec. 11, 2006), cited in O.J. C 258/25 (2006) (Johnson &Johnson/Pfizer Con-
sumer Healthcare); Commission Decision No. COMP/M.3696, slip op. (Dec. 21, 2005),
cited in OJ. C 140/5 (2005) (E.ON/MOL).
98. Or engaging in a disruption of supply that would compel customers to stop
purchasing RF coils from Intermagnetics. See Philips/Intermagnetics, slip op, supra
note 94, 56-57.
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non-horizontal mergers. In some instances, the costs and profits
of different foreclosure strategies can be quantified and com-
pared while in others, where such quantification will not be pos-
sible, the Commission will rely on proxies and reliable indica-
tors, as provided for in the draft guidelines. The most detailed
and sophisticated analysis of such incentives to date in a Com-
mission decision is probably to be found in the Thales/Finmeccan-
ica/Alcatel Alenia Space & Telespazio decision.
2. Thales/Finmeccanica/Alcatel Alenia Space and Telespazio
This case concerned the acquisition by Thales of Alcatel's
holdings in Alcatel Alenia Space ("AAS") and Telespazio, two
joint ventures jointly controlled pre-merger by Alcatel and
Finmeccanica, respectively active in space systems and space ser-
vices. The evidence collected during the first phase investigation
pointed to serious competition concerns, essentially in the form
of possible input foreclosure. Moreover, the package of behav-
ioral commitments offered by the parties were, in the Commis-
sion's analysis, insufficient to remove these concerns in a clear-
cut manner. The in-depth investigation, however, removed the
Commission's serious doubts as to the compatibility of the pro-
posed transaction with the Merger Regulation, and it was ulti-
mately cleared without conditions.
The notified operation involved a three-level vertical inte-
gration. At the upstream level, the operation combined Thales's
activities as a producer of Travelling Wave Tubes ("TWTs"), a
key component of commercial telecommunications satellites,
and AAS's activities in the field of Electronic Power Conditioners
("EPC"), another essential satellite component. Combined with
TWTs, EPCs constitute the Travelling Wave Tube Amplifiers
("TWTAs") that are used to amplify the satellite's electro-mag-
netic signals before they are sent back to Earth. TWTAs, there-
fore, represented the intermediate level of vertical integration.
Finally, at the downstream level, AAS operated as a commercial
telecommunications satellite prime contractor.
Given the characteristics of the space industry, there are a
very small number of market players at each level of the value
chain. In particular, at the upstream level Thales has a very
strong, almost dominant position in TWTs. L-3 Communica-
tions ("L-3"), a U.S. company, is its only competitor. Tesat (a
subsidiary of EADS N.V.) and L-3 are the two leading players at
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the upstream EPC and intermediate TWTA levels. The down-
stream market for commercial telecommunications satellites is
more competitive, with two European players, AAS and Astrium
(a subsidiary of EADS N.V.), four American suppliers (Boeing,
Lockheed Martin, Loral and Orbital) as well as Russian, Chinese
and Indian players.
In view of this market structure, the Commission examined
the ability, likelihood and potential effect of input foreclosure at
two levels-at the intermediate TWTA market and at the down-
stream satellite prime contracting level.
With regard to the examination of ability, a crucial issue was
the competitive constraint exercised by L3 on Thales for TWTs.
Indeed, evaluating L-3's competitive strength was necessary to
understand whether Thales's TWT customers would switch to L-
3 if they were foreclosed. The in-depth investigation demon-
strated that L-3 was a credible competitor to Thales for most
TWT frequency bands and that the majority of TWT customers
considered that L-3's TWTs were competitive as compared to
Thales's. L-3 also has a major competitive advantage in that it is
completely vertically-integrated and produces its EPCs internally.
Due to this presence of L-3, the Commission considered that the
merged entity would incur a significant commercial risk if it
were to foreclose its downstream rivals, as it would lose TWT
sales without being certain to gain a decisive advantage at the
TWTA or satellite levels.
In assessing ability, it was also necessary to assess whether it
would be feasible for the merged entity to combine AAS's EPCs
with Thales's TWTs to foreclose its rivals. As regards EPCs, the
market investigation established that Tesat and L-3 were the two
leading players in terms of product range and production capac-
ities and that AAS was not considered a credible supplier of
EPCs by most market players. In particular, AAS does not have
dual EPCs (EPCs that provide power to two TWTs), which ac-
count for half of the EPC demand. This is a growing market seg-
ment. The development, qualification and the acquisition of
flight heritage of AAS's dual EPCs will require several years. AAS
also has a limited EPC production capacity and would be unable
to increase this capacity rapidly. In view of the above, it was con-
cluded that the merged entity's ability to integrate AAS's EPCs
with Thales's TWTs and foreclose its competitors was further re-
stricted. Indeed, the merged entity would remain dependent on
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third-party suppliers for at least half of its EPC needs and any
attempt to foreclose them, and in particular Tesat, with regard
to TWTs, could lead to retaliation on EPC supplies.
With regard to the assessment of incentives, as in Philips!
Intermagnetics, the Commission evaluated Thales's and AAS's
margins at each level of the supply chain. It turned out that, due
to more intense competition, that margins are lower at the satel-
lite level than at the component level. The different margins
available at the different production levels, therefore, would not
give Thales incentives to forego sales of profitable satellite com-
ponents for uncertain benefits at the sub-systems or satellite
level. Indeed, as seen before, it is not guaranteed that a TWT
foreclosure strategy would increase significantly AAS's chances
to win satellite bids since L-3 offers competitive TWTs. In addi-
tion, the overall competitiveness of satellite prime contractor of-
fers depends not only on the TWTs but also on a broad range of
parameters (satellite architecture, satellite subsystems, schedule
and price, etc.). The benefits of any foreclosure strategy are
therefore highly uncertain.
While these general considerations are valid for the most
common TWTs and EPCs, the ability and incentives to foreclose
might vary for certain specific combinations and depending on
customer preferences. The particularly interesting element of
this case is, precisely, that the Commission identified a number
of market segments based on TWT, EPC and customer prefer-
ences, and assessed separately the new entity's ability and incen-
tives to foreclose in each market segment. The relative impor-
tance of these market segments was estimated on the basis of all
telecommunications satellites contracts awarded between 2001
and 2006. In this way, the Commission quantified the share of
the TWT/EPC market on which foreclosure was likely. This
analysis showed that foreclosure was likely only in less than ten
percent of TWTA and satellite bids.
This decision is also interesting with regard to the assess-
ment of legal disincentives. The Commission only examined
foreclosure strategies that would have affected the rivals of the
merged entity through non-price parameters. Indeed, these
practices could not be detected by other market participants, or
by antitrust enforcers, and therefore, even if they might be ille-
gal, this illegality could not be considered a disincentive.
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Finally, the Commission assessed the likely effects of the
transaction. Given the very limited market segments where the
new entity would be able to foreclose its rivals, these would not
likely be marginalized or forced to exit the market. But even if
an extreme scenario could be envisaged, where Tesat would be
forced to exit the market, Thales would effectively replace Tesat
and the current duopoly situation with L-3 would remain un-
changed.9" The transaction could also possibly be beneficial to
competition if the new entity were to enter those narrow market
segments, where it is currently not operating, in competition
with Tesat and L-3. The new entity could emerge as a third
player on certain segments of a market where there are only two
players at present.
At the prime contracting level, the Commission assessed
whether a foreclosure strategy limited to very narrow market seg-
ments would negatively affect the competitiveness of the merged
entity's rival satellite prime contractors. This appears to be im-
plausible since satellite prime contractors are generally active in
several market segments and achieve a significant part of their
business in the institutional market (with national and interna-
tional space agencies), which is not affected by the proposed
transaction. In addition, there are several credible prime con-
tractors, which makes the market for commercial telecom satel-
lites very competitive. This essentially excludes the risk of a sig-
nificant impediment to competition.
The assessment of possible effects described in the previous
paragraphs shows the clear emphasis that the Commission is
placing on consumer welfare. Indeed, even the possible foreclo-
sure of a particular competitor is not seen as grounds for inter-
vention if the competitive outcome would not be worsened for
customers one level below. The general principles described in
the guidelines in this regard are clearly illustrated in this case.
3. ENI/EDP/GDP
The decision in the ENI/EDP/GDP case provides a good il-
lustration of the various types of vertical effects that the Commis-
sion may identify. Although, in this specific case, it was found
99. Id. 62. As put forward in the Draft Guidelines, the lower the margins up-
stream, the lower the loss from restricting input sales. In this case, conversely, upstream
margins were relatively high.
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that each of these effects were likely to occur as a result of the
merger, they remain conceptually independent from each other.
The planned merger concerned the proposed acquisition of
Gs de Portugal ("GDP"), the incumbent gas company, by both
Energias de Portugal ("EDP"), the incumbent electricity com-
pany, and Eni Spa ("ENI"), an Italian energy company. The
merger was a vertical one to the extent that gas-fired power
plants have now become, for economic and environmental rea-
sons, the most common way of producing electricity. Gas is also
an important input because it represents one of the main pro-
duction costs of these plants (around seventy percent of the vari-
able costs). Several markets were affected by the operation both
within the electricity and the gas sectors, in which each of both
EDP and GDP, as incumbents, respectively held dominant posi-
tions pre-merger.
With respect to electricity, the Commission first found that
the merger would have given rise to several types of vertical anti-
competitive effects on the downstream wholesale market. Hav-
ing established that EDP's actual competitor would have no al-
ternative for its gas supplies than GDP in the medium term, the
Commission considered that the merger would have resulted in
input foreclosure because EDP would have had both the ability
and the incentives to raise its rival's costs, either by increasing its
prices and/or by managing the constraints in gas supply to the
detriment of the latter. The Commission also found that, by
gaining access to sensitive information relating to its competitor's
main input costs and daily nominations, EDP would have gained
increased market power. Indeed, given the specific features of
the market, in which its competitor's plant was next in the merit
order, such information would have allowed EDP to increase its
prices to the level of its competitor's with no fear of losing sales,
to the detriment of customers. For those reasons, the Commis-
sion further considered that the merger would have foreclosed
potential entry, if any, since future power generators would have
had to be supplied, under the same conditions, by their main
competitor. In addition, the Commission found that the merger
would have given rise to significant horizontal anti-competitive
effects by removing GDP as the best-placed potential competitor
on the various electricity markets concerned (i.e. wholesale, re-
tail and balancing power markets). For all these reasons, consid-
ered independently, the Commission concluded that EDP's
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dominant positions on the downstream electricity markets would
have been strengthened as a result of the merger.
On the upstream gas markets, the Commission found that
the merger would have foreclosed all gas demand (customer
foreclosure) on the distinct markets for gas supply to gas-fired
power plants and to local distribution companies, which could
otherwise have been challenged by potential competitors of
GDP, once those markets are open to competition. This was
mainly due to the fact that EDP would have been a significant
challengeable customer absent the merger, access to which was
essential for a potential entrant to reach the minimum efficiency
scale to be able to operate viably. The Commission determined
that, post-merger, EDP's incentives would have been to get sup-
plies from its subsidiary GDP, rather than to solicit tenders from
potential entrants. Accordingly, GDP's dominant position would
have been strengthened. In the various electricity retail markets,
the Commission's competition concerns were based on the hori-
zontal effects that the merger would have caused, by removing
EDP as the most likely entrant.
This decision was also interesting with regard to the issue of
legal disincentives. The parties argued, in effect, that some of
the foreclosure practices advanced by the Commission could be
illegal, not only from the point of view of EU competition law
but also with regard to national regulatory provisions. The Com-
mission examined such claims, but concluded that a dominant
operator in the gas wholesale market could use different mecha-
nisms to degrade supply to its competitors downstream that
could not be detected by national regulators in a timely fash-
ion100 and, therefore, would not face a disincentive to engage in
such practices, even under the assumption that they might be
considered illegal.
In the absence of adequate remedies for each of those com-
petition concerns, the merger was declared incompatible with
the common market. The decision was upheld by the CFI.10 1
The CFI, however, decided not to examine the Commission's as-
sessment of the vertical effects of the merger as it found that its
100. See Thales/Finmeccanica/Alcatel Alenia Space & Telespazio, slip op. supra
note 95, 343.
101. See ENI/EDP/GDP, slip op., supra note 96, 424; see also Commission Deci-
sion No. COMP/M.3696, slip op. 433, 443-46 (Dec. 12, 2005), cited in O.J. C 140/5
(2005) (E.ON/MOL).
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horizontal effects (i.e. the loss of potential competition) were
sufficient, in the absence of adequate remedies, to justify a find-
ing of incompatibility.
B. Recent Conglomerate Cases Assessed By the Commission
Since the entry into force of the new Merger Regulation in
May 2004, the Commission has not identified conglomerate con-
cerns in a single case. °2 There have been a few instances, how-
ever, where such concerns have been investigated before a clear-
ance decision was finally adopted.
In this Section, two cases are described where the Commis-
sion recently examined possible conglomerate concerns. They
include GE/Amersham1 °3 and Procter & Gamble/Gillette.10 4 Both
cases provide a good illustration of the steps that the Commis-
sion follows in such an assessment and the factors that matter in
assessing in practice such potential concerns.
1. GE/Amersham
The case involved the acquisition by GE of the U.K. com-
pany Amersham, a producer of diagnostic pharmaceuticals. Di-
agnostic pharmaceuticals are complements to various types of di-
agnostic imaging equipment supplied by GE (in particular X-ray,
CAT scan, ultrasound, magnetic resonance and nuclear imaging
equipment). Both GE and Amersham had market leading posi-
tions in their respective areas of activity in certain EU Member
States. As a result of the transaction, GE would be able to supply
customers with complete diagnostic imaging solutions, including
equipment and diagnostic pharmaceuticals.
The Commission investigated whether GE would have the
ability and incentive to bundle or tie the two complements and
whether such a strategy would negatively affect competition in
102. See EDP-Energias de Portugal, SA v. Commission, Case T-87/05, [2005]
E.C.R. 11-3745.
103. And since the prohibition of GE/Honeywell, the Commission has only
adopted two decisions, both relating to the same medical equipment market, requiring
remedial action on the basis of conglomerate concerns. See Commission Decision No.
COMP/M.2861, slip op. (Apr. 30, 2003), cited in O.J. C 311/12 (2002) (Siemens/
Dragerwerk/JV); Commission Decision No. 2004/322/EEC, O.J. L 109/1 (2003) (GE/
Instrumentarium).
104. See Commission Decision No. COMP/M.3304, slip op. (Jan. 21, 2004), cited in
O.J. C 301/10 (2003) (GE/Amersham).
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the market for the supply of diagnostic imaging equipment and
diagnostic pharmaceuticals to hospitals. Scenarios involving
mixed bundling, contractual tying and technical tying were con-
sidered separately in the decision.
The Commission's investigation into the possibility of the
merged entity engaging in such practices found significant dif-
ferences in the procurement procedures and supply chains for
imaging equipment and diagnostic pharmaceuticals, as well as
very different procurement timelines. For instance, diagnostic
imaging equipment has a long lifecycle of a minimum of ten
years, whereas diagnostic pharmaceuticals are purchased as con-
sumable products. While not entirely excluding the possibility
of the merged entity engaging in commercial bundling, these
market characteristics were found to reduce the likelihood of
any anticompetitive effects resulting from such a strategy. In ad-
dition, technical characteristics, rather than price, were found to
be the crucial factors in hospitals' purchasing decisions. Cus-
tomers had a strong preference for mix-and-match solutions of
their preferred components, reducing the effectiveness of bun-
dled offers. Despite GE and Amersham's strong positions in cer-
tain product markets, there existed a number of strong rivals in
each market who could counter any bundling effects.
Given customers' preference for combining so-called "best-
of-breed" products (as opposed to committing to a product bun-
dle offered by a fixed supplier pair) and the existence of several
unbundled alternatives, the Commission's investigation also re-
jected the possibility that GE/Amersham could engage in a con-
tractual or technical tying strategy to the detriment of customers.
On the basis of this analysis, the Commission cleared the transac-
tion after a first-phase investigation.
2. Procter & Gamble/Gillette
Horizontal effects from the merging firms' overlapping ac-
tivities in oral care and personal hygiene products were the pri-
mary focus of the Commission's investigation in the Procter &
Gamble/Gillette case. However, the Commission also consid-
ered possible conglomerate effects, arising from the fact that
some of the parties' products were complements (e.g. tooth-
brushes and toothpaste) and, more generally, that retail chains
purchase a wide range of their products simultaneously. The
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Commission's investigation focused on the possibility of foreclo-
sure resulting from the bundling of different products, as well as
on possible anticompetitive effects related to the merging firms'
position as so-called "category manager".
As to bundling, the Commission examined, in particular,
whether the merger would enable P&G and Gillette to impose
weak brands on their customers, to foreclose competitors from
access to the retailers' limited shelf space or to hinder entry of
new products to the market through tying or bundling practices.
However, a number of factors, including the presence of several
strong competitors, often with similarly wide product ranges,
and retailers' buyer power, led the Commission to conclude that
competitive harm was unlikely. The merger's competitive im-
pact was also limited by the fact that potential bundling opportu-
nities arise mainly within product categories (e.g. wash powder
and softener) rather than across categories (e.g. feminine care
and male wet shaving).
The Commission noted, in particular, that Procter & Gam-
ble/Gillette's enlarged product range may lead to efficiencies
from one-stop-shopping and economies of scope (e.g. in logis-
tics). In view of the fact that no likelihood of foreclosure had
been identified, there was no need for the Commission to at-
tempt to quantify such efficiencies and/or balance them against
possible anti-competitive effects. However, the recognition that
specific efficiencies may arise from extended product ranges
clearly shows the Commission's willingness to take these posi-
tively into account in the assessment of non-horizontal mergers.
This statement could also be seen as pointing towards a more
sceptical attitude with regard to theories of harm based exclu-
sively on portfolio effects, at least in the absence of foreclosing
practices such as bundling or tying.
The Commission approved the transaction after a first-
phase investigation subject to divestiture commitments removing
horizontal competition concerns.
CONCLUSION
This brief overview of recent cases involving the assessment
of vertical and conglomerate effects demonstrates that the Com-
mission has integrated in its practice the sound principles estab-
lished by the recent jurisprudence and developed a consistent
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approach and methodology to assess the impact on competition
of non-horizontal mergers.
In particular, it illustrates how the three-step analysis which
was elaborated in the Courts' jurisprudence and which has be-
come the basis for the analytical framework in the Non-Horizon-
tal Merger Guidelines, works in practice. The need for the Com-
mission to assess (i) the merging parties' ability to foreclose, and
(ii) their incentives to pursue a foreclosure strategy, followed by
(iii) an analysis of the impact that such foreclosure would have
on consumers in the downstream markets, imposes a welcomed
rigour in the Commission decisions' reasoning, limiting enforce-
ment intervention to cases where consumer harm appears likely.
These cases also demonstrate that, in assessing non-horizon-
tal operations, the Commission fully examines the elements that
can point towards the ability of the merged entity to foreclose,
but also those reducing the likelihood of foreclosure, including
possible counter-strategies that might be pursued by its rivals
post-merger. If ability cannot be excluded, incentives are system-
atically assessed, in line with the approach adopted by the CFI in
the GE/Honeywell judgment. As the Commission's decision in
Thales/AAS illustrates, this analysis has already reached consider-
able levels of sophistication in some cases.
The examination of legal disincentives also appears now to
be well integrated in the Commission's practice, despite the not
always consistent guidance provided on this issue by the courts.
It is noteworthy that merging parties are now frequently point-
ing to the existence of such a disincentive, at least to the extent
that dominance can be easily established or when national regu-
latory regimes would apply to the merged entity. The Commis-
sion, however, is dealing with such claims realistically: it may
conclude, for example, that clearly illegal and easily detectable
foreclosing practices should not be taken into consideration, but
in many instances, as seen in ENI/EDP/GDP, the merged entities
have other alternative means of foreclosing rivals, which may be
considerably more difficult to detect and punish, and which
should therefore be taken into account in the analysis.
The cases examined also highlight the focus on consumer
welfare as the ultimate goal of EU merger control. In Philips!
Intermagnetics, in spite of high market shares upstream in the
"open" market, vertical concerns were excluded because no
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harm to downstream customers could be shown. Similarly, in
Thales/AAS, a detailed analysis of the competitive constraints on
the merging parties allowed the Commission to discount possi-
ble competition concerns arising from the high levels of concen-
tration at various stages of the value chain. The Commission en-
ded up clearing an operation, despite some risk of foreclosure of
a competitor, because the likelihood of consumer harm could
not be established.
Finally, the cases examined above did not require the Com-
mission to balance anti-competitive effects and efficiencies, even
if efficiencies arising from an extended product range were ac-
knowledged in Procter & Gamble/Gillette. Such a balancing is
likely to be one of the most difficult and controversial aspects of
future assessments. Experience will tell whether the Commis-
sion is able to carry this out satisfactorily. The difficulty inherent
in such analysis, however, should not in itself be a reason to re-
frain from engaging in the assessment of possible non-horizontal
anti-competitive effects, as some have argued, in particular when
recent practice shows that harm is likely to arise in certain scena-
rios where efficiencies would be unlikely to materialize.
The public consultation on the draft enforcement guide-
lines shows that this general approach was broadly welcomed
and encouraged the Commission to adopt it definitively. This is
what the final version of the guidelines did, after taking into ac-
count some of the comments received. It is now the duty of the
Commission and the Courts to develop this guidance in individ-
ual decisions and judgments to enhance even further the coher-
ence and predictability of EU Merger Control policy with regard
to non-horizontal operations.
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